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Abstract
This paper offers a new representation of discrimination on the job market based on the most
recent findings in the socio-psychological academic literature about human behaviour. Put it
simply, it is assumed that the agents prefer working with people like themselves. This
"affinity" principle is modelled through a distance between an individual (the candidate for a
job) and the staff of the firm. Contrary to the classical view according to which
discrimination results from asymmetric information, this new model provides a rationale for
the presence of discriminative attitudes on the job market even when full information is
available on the skill levels of all candidates for a working position.
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Discriminations on the job market arise when hiring preferences depend on characteristics 
unrelated to professional skills (gender, colour, ethnicity, names
1, etc.). As the possibility that 
economic agents make irrational choices based on racism, sexism, or any a priori belief, does 
not fit well into the classical homo economicus paradigm; economists have devoted much 
attention finding explanations for the observable persistence of discrimination. 
 
In opposition to the theory of Becker (1957) based on “pure” racism (disliking some specific 
categories of the population), the rationale initiated by Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972) and 
further adopted by a large body of economists stems from the fact that firms have only 
imperfect information on productivity (Coate and Loury, 1993; Altonji and Blank, 1999; 
Fang, 2001). Therefore, employers base their choices on a priori beliefs drawn from their own 
statistical experience. This statistical discrimination story embodies an optimistic perspective: 
observing actual productivity could lead to giving up erroneous beliefs through a Bayesian 
learning process. 
 
This paper offers a different model of human behaviour in line with recent findings in the 
socio-psychological academic literature. Namely, we assume that the “unfairness” component 
in hiring decisions is the outcome of a stable utility function translating the fact that people 
prefer working with people like themselves. The “affinity” attitude does not necessarily relate 
to racism, sexism, etc., but can obviously be linked to it. It refers to concepts like social 
categorizations (Wenzel, 2001; Garcia et al., 2005) and “people accounting” defined by 
Garcia and Ybarra (2007).  
 
According to Kang and Banaji (2006), people’s judgement exhibits a permanent bias toward 
members of other groups which can influence all decisions to be made by human entities 
including firms. A formal quantification of this bias requests a measure of dissimilarity 
between human beings. For this purpose, we suggest using the mathematical notion of 
distance. A group of individuals is associated to its representative agent and the firm’s hiring 
policy is influenced by the distance between its representative employee and the applicants for 
new jobs in addition to professional skill. 
 
Thus, the choice of a candidate is based on two criteria: the adequacy to the job description 
and the affinity with the firm’s representative agent. The first criterion is economically 
consistent, while the second might reveal costly to the firm’s shareholders. Discrimination in 
this sense appears as an agency problem, leading to hiring potentially suboptimal employees 
having affinities with the firm’s personnel.  
 
Section 2 explains how discriminatory decisions may be described through a mathematical 
distance. Section 3 defines the firm hiring mechanism. Section 4 concludes by providing 
suggestions for further research.  
 
2. Affinity as a distance 
 
Firms may be seen as a collection of individuals endowed with characteristics among which 
some are linked to work abilities, and the others are independent from it. In a world without 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004).   2
discrimination, only the characteristics in the first group should influence the hiring process as 
well as the salaries of the new entrants. 
 
Consider a firm whose staff S is made of r employees: { } 1,, r Sp p = … . This firm is offering a 
job. Let  { } 1,, rr n Pp p ++ = … be the set of the n candidates to this job. Each agent, i p , whether 
in S or in P, is characterized by a level of professional skill  , 1, , ,
i sI R i r n ∈ =+ …  supposed 
one-dimensional for sake of simplicity (for instance, the degree level) and a vector of m job-
unrelated characteristics
2  () 1,, , 1 ,,
ii m
m x xI R i r n ∈ =+ …… . All individual characteristics and 
skills are assumed observable. Thus, there is no asymmetry of information.  
 
The model assumes that any human being – in particular the ones belonging to the firm’s staff 
– prefer being in contact with people sharing as many characteristics as possible with him/her. 
Dissimilarities are modelled thanks to the Euclidian distance, the most common distance
3 
used in the characteristics space
m IR . In this framework, the distance  ij d  between the skill-
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The smallest the distance, the most affinity there exist between the two individuals. Any 
characteristic can enter into this distance provided that it is not linked to productivity. As this 
distance is the seed for discrimination on the job market, it should not incorporate any feature 
linked to job abilities.  
 
We define a discriminative hiring process as a process where the distance between the firm’s 
employees and candidate does matter. Now, in order to model this concept adequately, some 
kind of aggregation is required for the firm’s staff. For this purpose let’s introduce the firm 
“representative agent” in the hiring process.  
 
Different views on the hiring process lead to different definitions of this representative agent. 
First, one can consider that the decision is taken by the board, which is quite unrealistic, 
except in very special cases. Second, one can take the HR director as the unique decision-
maker. Third, one can aggregate the characteristics of the whole staff. Aggregation can be 
performed along various schemes regarding weighting coefficients. 
 
Let  p   denote the representative agent of the firm. We propose the following general 
definition: 
 
The hiring process is said discriminatory if the choice of the new employee depends on the 
distances () ,, 1 , , i dp p i r r n =+ +   … , between the firm’s representative agent and the 
candidates to the new position. 
                                                 
2 We assume that characteristics are given by numbers, which may reveal unrealistic in several circumstances. 
Nevertheless, the model may be generalized to qualitative characteristics like gender or color, but then specific 
metrics are to be introduced. 
 
3 Other distances may be considered to introduce different weights associated to the n characteristics. 
Alternatively, different scaling factors may be introduced in the characteristics measures in order to take account 
for their relative impact in subjective distances between the group members.   3
 
In order to illustrate this definition, the next section will provide an example. 
 
3. An example 
 
Consider that the firm’s representative agent is given by aggregating the whole staff. In other 
words, the representative agent  p    is the mathematical centre of gravity
4, that is, the virtual 
agent who would be endowed with the staff’s average
5 characteristics vector 
() 1,,
m
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 Then, the affinity between a job applicant,  , 1, , i p ir rn = ++ … , and the firm is measured by 
the distance between the vectors of characteristics of this applicant and the representative 
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Suppose now that the available job requires a specific skill level, s*.If the hiring process is 
not discriminatory, then the optimal candidate for the firm is the one which lies the closest to 
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When discrimination enters the process, then the job attribution is performed through the 
minimization of an objective function with depends on the adequacy to the job (the economic 
objective) but also on the distance in Eq. (3) (the affinity objective). For instance, in a linear 
context, one gets: 
[][ ] ()
2
,1 , ,, 0
i
ii pir rn Min s s d p p αα
=+ + −+ >
…
  * .         ( 4 )  
The parameter  0 α ≥  gauges the importance of discrimination in the hiring process. The 
discrimination-free case, which is also the economic optimum for the firm, corresponds 
to 0 α = . For any 0 α > , there is a cost associated to the suboptimality of the job attribution.  
 
Regarding economic consequences of a discriminative hiring process, two kinds of 
malfunctioning can be observed: either the new employee is over-qualified for his job and 
part of his professional skill value is useless, or he is under-qualified for his job and he job is 
not well accomplished. Assuming wages are at their market value, that is, discriminations are 
not entering the macroeconomic equilibrium prices, then it means that discriminative hiring 
process imply either excessive costs (wages for over-qualified employees) or productivity 
losses (under-qualified employees). In specifications (3) and (4), a symmetric quadratic loss 




In the purely deterministic setting proposed by this note, discrimination stems from affinity 
preferences. It could therefore be rationalized through the existence of some reward 
                                                 
4 Note that the ex-ante level of diversity within the firm is not considered. 
5 Alternatively, a weighted average could be used for taking into account the relative importance of the firm’s 
employees.    4
associated to hiring people with similar skill-unrelated characteristics. In this sense, this paper 
acknowledges an agency problem already put forward by Arrow (1998). This representation 
opens the way to wider application fields, stretching well beyond job market issues. Actually, 
discrimination modelling could enter the formalization of most economic decisions involving 
human contacts (business associations, consumption of services, marketing, etc.) 
 
The proposed representation contrasts with the common economic approach because 
discrimination here is not driven by asymmetric information. Actually, the story here does not 
require asymmetric information but it is still compatible with it. For instance, learning about 
others’ culture and habits might well help reducing some perceived distances. In this respect, 
the mathematical notion of distance offers a wide range of possible specifications
6, of which 
only a basic example has been proposed. 
 
The economic loss resulting from an affinity-based hiring mechanism depends on several 
parameters which relate to the production technology, the characteristics of the candidates, the 
affinity attitude within the firm, etc. However, one could argue that, if the employees prefer 
working with people like themselves, then more diversity could have an indirect bad influence 
on their productivity. Notwithstanding, the literature has shown that, in many circumstances, 
diversity by itself is often associated to better financial performance
7. Firm heterogeneity 
seems thus desirable for economic as well as for ethical reasons. Further empirical studies 
should check what happens when employees experience the arrival of an unwanted colleague. 
Does it really weaken their productivity? 
 
The hiring process can be sequentially repeated, making the representative agent (for instance, 
the staff’s centre of gravity) move over time. As the affinity principle tend to concentrate 
similar people in a given firm, the convergence toward a spontaneously less discriminatory 
equilibrium is very unlikely. However, incentive policies can be initiated by the firm owners 
or public policymakers. Therefore, our model is intended to be included in a broader 
specification and discussion on the cost of discrimination and its possible remedies, like 
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